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Abstract In discussions about the legalisation of active,
voluntary euthanasia it is sometimes claimed that what
should happen in a liberal society is that the two sides in
the debate ‘‘agree to disagree’’. This paper explores what is
entailed by agreeing to disagree and shows that this is
considerably more complicated than what is usually
believed to be the case. Agreeing to disagree is philo-
sophically problematic and will often lead to an unstable
compromise.
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In discussions about the legalisation of active, voluntary
euthanasia performed by medical doctors
1 it is sometimes
claimed that what should happen in a liberal society is
(merely?) that the two sides in the debate ‘‘agree to dis-
agree’’ or ‘‘split the difference’’ (Huxtable 2007); and the
Netherlands is taken as an example of this kind of
accommodation. Agreeing to disagree will allow persons to
pursue their own idea of the good life and the good death
both as patients and as health care professionals, it will
calm the often vociferous and unnecessarily antagonistic
public debate, it will exhibit state impartiality and it will
lead to a resolution that is the right one in an area where
signiﬁcant liberty interests of patients are at stake.
The underlying idea is that even if we cannot agree on
whether euthanasia is ethically acceptable we can reach a
societal accommodation that allows those who can ﬁnd a
willing doctor to end their life by euthanasia without fear of
criminal prosecution.
The present paper will problematise this account of the
virtues and effects of ‘‘agreeing to disagree’’ through an
analysis of what that type of societal accommodation
actually entails in the context of euthanasia.
The ﬁrst part of the paper will brieﬂy rehearse some
philosophical arguments against compromise or accom-
modation as a viable option in a context of deep value
conﬂict about an important ethical issue.
The second part will then more concretely analyse
(1) what the pro-euthanasia side wants to achieve by the
legalisation of euthanasia and (2) what the anti-euthanasia
side is worried about in relation to legalisation.
The third part will then show that ‘‘agreeing to disagree’’
is signiﬁcantly more complicated and fraught with prob-
lems than is sometimes assumed.
Throughout the paper no position will be taken as to
whether euthanasia is in general, or in speciﬁc instances
ethically justiﬁable. The analysis will primarily be drawing
on resources from political philosophy and political science
and not from moral philosophy.
The paper will also not try to provide a ﬁnal answer to
the question of whether ‘‘agreeing to disagree’’ is a
philosophically coherent position to advocate given the
strong underlying views on both sides of the debate. But it
is worth noting that for someone, such as Dame Mary
Warnock believes that doctors who refuse euthanasia
requests are ‘Genuinely wicked’ it would be strange to
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1 In the following all unqualiﬁed uses of the term ‘‘euthanasia’’ refer
to active, voluntary euthanasia performed by a doctor.
123
Med Health Care and Philos (2010) 13:399–402
DOI 10.1007/s11019-010-9264-1agree to disagree and difﬁcult to see what the agreement
could be about (News Letter 2009).
Agreeing to disagree and deep value conﬂict
Within a modern liberal society it is arguable that the best
way of resolving policy differences is through some form
of deliberative democracy. The parties sit down, trash out
their differences and try to argue their way to an outcome
that is either accepted or at least acceptable to all partici-
pants in the process (Guttman and Thompson 1990;
Guttman 1993; Habermas 1992; Habermas 1995; Rawls
1996; Holm 2006).
At both the theoretical and the practical level this kind of
process is likely toworkbest whenthe different views of the
parties stem only from the fact that they have different
interests. Such differences can be mediated through reﬂec-
tion and/or compromise.
If, however the differences are differences in values it
may be more difﬁcult to achieve a resolution or a com-
promise. Values are often more intimately connected with
the participant’s ultimate world view than interests are and
they more often involve metaphysical commitments
(McCarthy 1996).
2 This is, for instance quite obvious in the
abortion debate where one of the issues at stake is the
metaphysics of persons and of personal identity.
There are circumstances where disagreements about
values are likely to generate irresolvable standoffs. This is
especially likely to happen if one or both of the positions
involve what John Woods calls:
‘‘Philosophy’s Most Difﬁcult Problem.L e tA =
\{P1,…., Pn}, C[be a valid argument, a sequence
in which C is a logical consequence of proceeding
steps. Philosophy’s Most Difﬁcult Problem is that of
adjudicating in a principled way the conﬂict between
supposing that A is a sound demonstration of a
counterintuitive truth, as opposed to seeing it as a
counterexample of its premises.’’ (Woods 2000,
p. 205).
Discussions about euthanasia often involve exactly this
kind of problem. It is, for instance well known that the
personhood approaches to moral status involved in many
pro-euthanasia arguments generate highly counterintuitive
results in relation to beginning of life and end of life issues
and that these very results are often seen as a reductio of
such approaches by their opponents.
If, furthermore the values on both sides are ﬁrmly
entrenched we may reach a standoff that excludes nego-
tiability, where the mere suggestion that there is a possible
compromise is seen as grotesque and improper.
What is the legalisation of euthanasia supposed
to achieve?
Let us, despite the philosophical problems raised above
move on and ask what proponents of euthanasia want to
achieve through the legalisation of the activity.
The most minimal legalisation of euthanasia would sim-
ply involve the decriminalisation of the activity, but sup-
porters of euthanasia understandably want more, because
meredecriminalisationwillnotinitselfentailthateuthanasia
is available.
Decriminalisation is, for instance, compatible with
strong professional condemnation and disciplinary action
and even with expulsion from the profession of those who
perform the acts. The UK regulator of medical doctors the
General Medical Council (GMC) does, for instance, oblige
doctors to observe duties that they are not legally obliged to
observe (e.g. acting as good Samaritans) and it requires
them to abstain from acts that are not illegal (e.g. looking at
legal internet pornography on work computers). Doctors
who breach GMC guidance in these areas may lose their
license to practice, even if they have done nothing that
could remotely be construed as illegal or criminal. Sup-
porters of euthanasia will therefore not only require that
euthanasia is decriminalised but also that it is deemed to be
acceptable professional practice and are furthermore likely
to require that those who choose to practise euthanasia
within the agreed boundaries are not discriminated against
in employment decisions.
Thisispartofamoregeneralfeatureofthepro-euthanasia
position. Those who hold this position view euthanasia as
morally justiﬁed and therefore also want it to become
socially normalised. For them euthanasia is just a normal
medicalservice;andinpublichealthcaresystemsorsystems
with a large component of third party payment supporters of
euthanasia will also want euthanasia to be conceived of as a
normal health care service in relation to payment. For
instance, if a General Practitioner (GP) attends a patient at
home to perform euthanasia the GP should be reimbursed as
for any other home visit of similar complexity.
The requirement of normalisation of euthanasia also
reaches beyond the health care setting to issues such as
death certiﬁcation, burial and insurance law. For the pro-
ponent of euthanasia, death following euthanasia should be
2 Let us in passing note that any call for the exclusion of
metaphysical commitments from ethical debates about human life
and death is potentially highly problematic. First because every
participant in the debate has metaphysical commitments that inﬂu-
ences their position and second because the exclusion of metaphysical
commitments from the debate is likely to be a bigger burden for some
participants than for others.
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suicide or a potentially illegal killing.
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What worries does legalisation of euthanasia raise?
Opponents of euthanasia share the concern about the effect
of legalisation on the status of health care professionals,
but they are likely to focus on the other side of the coin, i.e.
the effects in relation to those who do not want to perform
euthanasia. Any euthanasia legislation is likely to contain a
conscientious objection provision, but this may not be
enough to protect doctors and other health care profes-
sionals in the long run. After the legalisation of abortion it
has become difﬁcult for doctors who do not want to per-
form abortions to specialise in gynaecology and obstetrics
and similar difﬁculties might occur in some specialties in
relation to euthanasia. There has also been a tendency in
some jurisdictions to interpret conscientious objection
clauses quite narrowly both with regard to the type of
health care personnel that is covered and with regard to the
kind of involvement that a person can object to participate
in. Opponents of euthanasia are therefore likely to require
stronger protections than mere conscientious objection.
A related issue is that a right to conscientious objection
is often combined with a professional duty to refer the
patient to another practitioner willing to perform the act in
question. But for someone who thinks that euthanasia is
closely akin to murder such a duty is highly problematic.
More generally those who are opposed to euthanasia
will also be opposed to the general normalisation of
euthanasia as a medical service. They are likely to want it
to be kept separate and special, and may be unlikely to be
willing to have it included in normal reimbursement
mechanisms. This may be combined with an unwillingness
to contribute ﬁnancially through insurance premiums or
taxation to a practice seen as morally abhorrent.
In relation to resources in the health care system there
may also be a worry about whether introducing euthanasia
as an option undermines or weakens claims to have
expensive life prolonging treatment provided, or whether in
the long run a presumption would be established that
choosing euthanasia was the morally right choice in some
circumstances of severe resource constraints.
Opponents of euthanasia are also likely to have a dis-
tinct worry in relation to whether both sides involved in the
societal bargain are willing to let it stand. Is ‘‘agreeing to
disagree’’ about active, voluntary euthanasia performed by
a medical doctor a stable accommodation or just a staging
post to the legalisation of other forms of euthanasia. This
is, paradoxically a concern that is at least partially fuelled
by the writings of academic bioethicists and legal scholars
in relation to end of life decisions and abortion. A typical
type of argument in these writings is a consistency argu-
ment of the form ‘‘society already allows X, therefore it is
inconsistent not to allow Y which is currently prohibited’’.
There are many problems with consistency arguments of
this type, but they are never the less often rhetorically
powerful (Holm 2003). It is obvious that the legalisation of
euthanasia will enable a variety of new consistency
arguments to be brought forward. What is going to be
legalised is, for instance not initially ‘‘euthanasia on
demand’’ but euthanasia in cases of terminal disease with
signiﬁcant, irremediable suffering. But the underlying
justiﬁcation for allowing euthanasia only in this speciﬁc
class of circumstances is inherently unstable because it
relies on elements of both respect for autonomy and the
relief of suffering.
Why is agreeing to disagree difﬁcult?
From the analysis so far it has become clear that there are
several problems with implementing ‘‘agreeing to dis-
agree’’ as a societal accommodation or compromise in
relation to euthanasia, even if we believed it made philo-
sophical sense to advocate such a position.
The ﬁrst problem is that whereas it might be possible to
agree to disagree about the very narrow issue of decrimi-
nalisation of euthanasia, it is much more difﬁcult to agree
to disagree about the normalisation of euthanasia as a type
of medical/health care intervention. It is practically difﬁ-
cult to conﬁne the legalisation of euthanasia to mere
permission. There will almost always also be an element of
acceptance in any legalisation.
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The second problem is that the situation established by
agreeing to disagree is unstable. It satisﬁes neither side in
the debate and there is therefore always a temptation to try
to disturb the equilibrium and get a little more; and a
possible lingering suspicion that that is exactly what the
other side will try to do.
The third problem is that any move from the now pre-
vailing status quo in most countries, i.e. that euthanasia is
illegal will be a move that only involves loss seen from the
point of view of a strict opponent of euthanasia. For such
and opponent there is nothing to be gained in the move
itself and the only incentive to agree to disagree is if it is
3 This is exactly why the ‘‘Dutch solution’’, leaving euthanasia as
technically illegal but not prosecuted if the criteria are fulﬁlled is
often criticised by proponents of euthanasia.
4 Even mere decriminalisation of euthanasia by medical doctors
could be seen as conveying some form of social acceptance by
classifying the act as a medical act and thereby lending it some of the
lustre (if such lustre exists) of medicine and the medical profession.
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will be more restrictive than any position that would be
reached without agreeing to this form of accommodation.
If the position in the Netherlands can rightly be
described as ‘‘agreeing to disagree’’, and I do not want to
claim that this is an accurate or adequate description, then
it is a position that has been reached through a long his-
torical development. It has been reached in a speciﬁc
societal context and there is evidence that what the Dutch
have agreed to disagree about has changed over time. It is
not obvious that other societies can reach the same kind of
accommodation in one single step.
For the philosopher the main problem with ‘‘agreeing to
disagree’’ as a policy solution is that it requires both sides
to suspend judgement on whether the counterintuitive
consequences of accepting, for instance a personhood
based justiﬁcation of the permissibility of voluntary, active
euthanasia should count as a reductio or should instead be
seen as pointing to future goals for policy development. It
furthermore requires the philosophical proponents of
euthanasia to acquiesce in what they see as illiberal leg-
islation prohibiting euthanasia in circumstances where it
should be allowed; and it requires the philosophical
opponents of euthanasia to accept that a kind of killing they
think is profoundly unethical should be allowed in law. We
can see how philosophers on both sides might ‘‘agree to
disagree’’ as citizens, but if they continue to believe, as
they almost inevitably must do that they have the correct
argument on their side, agreeing to disagree will create
signiﬁcant cognitive dissonance and unease.
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